Management Planning for Indigenous Territories in Amazonia: Addressing the Social Factors

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Abstract: Since the late 1960's, indigenous Amazonians have received property title or other forms of government recognition to over 100 million hectares of tropical forest; most of this is recognized as common property territories of varying size. The largest single area is found in the Rio Negro Basin of Brazil where President Cardoso recently signed a decree establishing five contiguous indigenous territories with a total of over 10 million hectares. Developing and implementing management plans and related economic initiatives for these millions of hectares of indigenous Amazonian common property is the next and urgent chapter in the long history of their struggle for survival and recognition. While there are many important technical and scientific aspects to successful territorial management, positive outcomes in this process ultimately depend on how a series of social factors are addressed. Based on a 3 year, 5 country research effort that looked at the changing economy of indigenous Amazonians, we examine in this paper two of the deepest level, and therefore most complicated, sets of social factors. These are 1. the development of new institutions for governing these territories that go beyond the existing kin- and ethnic-based institutions and that include all co-owners of a community's territory; and 2. the development of a new moral and economic order that combines the indigenous values of social solidarity, equilibrium and reciprocity, with the values linked with the market economy .

1. **Rebuilding Sustainable Livelihoods in Indigenous Amazonia**

In view of the massive state and private investment in Amazonian development and colonization over the past four decades, rapid change for its indigenous peoples was and is inevitable. The positive side of these changes has been made possible largely through a widespread movement that combined the talents of Indian peoples and non-Indian collaborators. Today perhaps 70% of the indigenous inhabitants of the basin has formed some sort of a representative organization among neighboring communities; often these are an ethnic-based federation, linked to regional, national and international networks of other similar organizations. In general, they all seek recognition of basic individual and collective rights, and for an equitable and autonomous process of local development.

In response to this dramatic situation, in 1992 the Coordinating Body of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin (COICA) and Oxfam America undertook a novel research effort to look at the changing indigenous economy and strategies for achieving a more secure and sustainable future[1]. The effort was undertaken by a team of twenty-two researchers, half of whom were indigenous; this team conducted five in-depth case studies and 25 evaluative studies in five Amazonian countries

As the Amazonian states move forward in recognizing their territorial rights, and in demarcating and titling areas of common property for them, the central concern for indigenous Amazonians has become their economic future: the creation of a development model that allows local groups to satisfy their needs for both subsistence produce and market goods without sacrificing either the ecosystem in which they live or the bonds of kin-based social solidarity which tie the group to their historical identity. Our research brought to light many of the major issues that indigenous Amazonians have to face as they bring the market economy into their lives (Smith and Wray 1996).

Without doubt, rebuilding a sustainable livelihood begins with secure access to a wide variety of resources found within a recognized and titled territory. Along with the right to a secure territory goes an obligation to manage and govern that territory well. During the past three decades, the resources available to local settlements have been reduced and enclosed within property boundaries while settlements have grown in size and become less mobile. To safeguard a viable future for both subsistence and market-oriented activities under these conditions, the inhabitants of each indigenous territory urgently need to develop technically

viable plans for the sustainable use and management of their common resources. However, both the development and implementation of such plans necessarily takes place within a social context; in the final analysis, the success of the plan depends on addressing the issues arising from that social context.

For example, access to resources within a demarcated territory raises the question of who should own them, how tenancy and usufruct rights should be defined, and how the interests of individuals, domestic units and the collectivity can be balanced, especially within a market-oriented context that emphasizes the supremacy of the individual in society. Outcomes depend to a great degree on having an effective local organization with strong institutional arrangements for establishing and implementing agreements on resource use and conservation.

A major challenge continues to be bridging the cultural breach between the indigenous Amazonian economy and the market economy. We encountered within the moral order of indigenous societies actively participating in the market economy a subtle, yet profound confusion of basic values. Caught between two different economic imperatives, many indigenous Amazonians are confused about how to best enhance their long term personal interest and security: by accumulating personal wealth or by strengthening the social bonds of mutual obligation and care. Developing a new guiding ethic for economic behavior is of fundamental importance for the sustainable livelihood of indigenous Amazonians and the long term management of their territories.

2. **Territorial Rights and Common Property**

The economic future of indigenous Amazonians remains intimately linked to their secure access to the land, forest, animals, water, and sub-soils of a territory of sufficient size to permit carrying out all subsistence activities plus new activities aimed at the market (Chirif et al, 1992). For that reason, a primary goal of every indigenous organization since the 1960's has been and continues to be obtaining recognition and property rights to the land and resources required by their members. Indigenous peoples' right to legal proprietorship of a territory is now part of international law, codified in ILO Convention 169; as such it is also public law for Peru and Bolivia which have ratified the Convention.

Because of their colonial legacy, the Amazonian states have been very reluctant to recognize the collective property rights of their indigenous populations. For that reason, this issue has been the center of conflict between the states and indigenous Amazonians for many decades. The level of conflict has increased recently as the indigenous political organizations, within the framework of the UN Workgroup on Indigenous Populations, developed the notion of territoriality, that is, that each indigenous people has a right to a territorial base including all the resources found therein. Despite the recognition of this concept at the international level, with few exceptions, Amazonian states have been reluctant to accept the concept of territory, arguing that that is the exclusive purview of the nation-state.

In the five countries covered by our research, Colombia and Brazil have moved the furthest in granting constitutional recognition to territorial rights for indigenous Amazonians. In Brazil indigenous territories are often very extensive (87,295 hectares in the case of the Rio Jordão Indian Area where our research took place; government recognition was recently granted to over 10 million hec. in 5 contiguous territories in the Rio Negro region). However, Indian lands are still bound to a quasi-tutorial relationship with the state through its Indian agency, FUNAI.

The Colombian constitution recognizes directly held common property rights for its indigenous citizens; generally in the Amazon, these rights are exercised in the form of extensive *resguardos*, the largest of which is the ex-Predio Putumayo with 3 million hectares. Furthermore, the Constitution legalizes the possibility that an indigenous territory can become an administrative unit of the state, with its own budget and decision making prerogatives.

Peru's 1974 Native Communities Law was the first in the Amazon to recognize collective property rights for communities of indigenous Amazonians. Since then, the state has recognized more than twelve hundred Native Communities with territories ranging in size from a hundred hectares to four hundred thousand hectares; a total of around 9 million hectares has been titled in Peru as common property of indigenous Amazonians. In many areas like the Ampiyacu river basin and the lower Urubamba river basin, the mosaic of contiguously titled Native Communities together with Communal Reserves and Conservation Areas in fact create much larger territorial units; in the lower Urubamba the mosaic of 21 Machiguenga Native Communities plus proposed reserves totals over one million hectares. However, under Peruvian legislation, a Native Community does not have property rights over

those areas designated by the state as forest lands, over the subsoil, nor over water resources.

In both Bolivia and Ecuador, it has been official policy for decades to recognize indigenous property rights through the Agrarian Reform and Colonization Laws which offer the possibility of small individual family parcels associated in communities. Only recently, under political pressure from successful actions of civil disobedience, have these two states given partial recognition to broader territorial claims. In Bolivia in 1990 and again in 1996, the "March for Territory and Dignity" organized by the different federations of indigenous peoples resulted in a promise for official recognition of thirteen territories, among them the Multiethnic Territory (355,000 hectares) and the Chimane Territory (392,000) in the Chimane Forest. The Ecuadorian government was pressured by the Indigenous Peoples March of 1992 to recognize a mosaic of 19 indigenous territories with a total of 1.115 million hectares of Pastaza Province.

A Broad Spectrum of Property Regimes As a result of these different legal regimes, the varying criteria used to define indigenous property, and the changing political climate, there is tremendous variety in the property regimes governing indigenous Amazonian lands and resources today. This is evident from our case studies. For example, in Guarayos (Bolivia), despite the historical existence of mission boundaries which coincided roughly with the territorial boundaries of Guarayo sub-groups (roughly 150,000 hectares per mission), the Bolivian state, under the 1952 Agrarian Reform Law, limited its legal recognition to one parcel (50 to 100 hectares) for each Guarayo head-of-household registered at the time of titling; excess lands ended up in the hands of non-Indian cattle ranchers[2].

In the Ampiyacu, the Peruvian government gave a common property title to all members of each of the 13 Bora and Huitoto Native Communities, commonly grouped around a school. These titled areas range in size from Pucaurquillo Huitoto with 1,987 hectares to Brillo Nuevo with 5,381 hectares for a total area among the thirteen of 34.495 hectares (Informe Final 1995).

In our area of study between the Caquetá and Apaporis rivers, the Colombian government extended legal recognition to three *resguardos*. These are Yai-gojé Apaporis, Río Miritiparaná and Comeyafu which incorporate a total of 23 different settlements, with a surprisingly complex mixture of ethnic groups. For example, the Community of Centro Oiyaca which occupies approximately 72,500 hectares of the Resguardo Yai-gojé is relatively

isolated and homogeneous; of the total population of 80 persons (12 families)in 1992, 85% were Letuama; the others were from 4 other ethnic groups (Informe Final 1995) On the other hand, the Community of Parcialidad Yukuna (32,250 hectares) of the Resguardo Comeyafu had 33 families (174 persons) in 1992, who claim origins in 16 different ethnic groups.

3. Managing Indigenous Territories for a Sustainable Livelihood

The New Indigenous Economy and its Impact on Natural Resources All of the economic initiatives we looked at in our study, whether for subsistence or cash needs, have an impact on the natural resources found in and around the Indian settlements. Many of these initiatives attempted to generate a cash income by extracting or transforming some natural resource, giving little thought to the long term affect on the resource used or on the ecosystem as a whole.

The INDERENA Smoked Fish Project depended on the natural reserves of catfish species found in the upper Amazon River near the Colombian town of Leticia.

> "The project foresaw marketing 12 tons of smoked fish a year in Bogotá; it therefore would require 34 tons of fresh fish from the catfish family. There were no previous studies on the capacity of this species to survive this rate of exploitation, given that this species is already over-fished for the Leticia market." (Informe Final 1995).

The OPIP Craft Marketing Project (Pastaza, Ecuador) sold large quantities of colorfully-painted wood carvings made by the Quichua from community-owned stocks of balsa and canela wood"The production of wood carvings consumes a great deal of balsa and canela wood; both species tend to disappear from the areas of greatest production. There is no plan for managing these resources." (Informe Final 1995).

The FECONA Crafts Marketing Project (Ampiyacu river, Peru) encouraged the production and sale of hammocks and shoulder bags made from the fibers of the *chambira* palm.

> "The project should not be reactivated because the raw material (*chambira*) is being used up without any thought as to its conservation. There is no attempt to manage this species so that [its reproduction] keeps up with the level of exploitation; for that reason it tends to disappear." (Informe Final 1995).

Even projects for improving access to markets can impact the local ecosystem. The increased possibilities for selling bananas and manioc opened up by the Volvo truck put into service by the Aguaruna Huambiza Council's Economic Program (upper Marañon river, Peru) resulted

in an increase in the total area planted in bananas and manioc for those families with access to the truck's services. The Chimane Jatata Marketing Project (Beni, Bolivia) improved the price received by the Chimane for each roofing panel made from *jatata* palm leaves by organizing the cooperative selling of the product; in so doing, the Chimane produced more roofing panels resulting in an increased harvest of *jatata* palm.

As we learned in all five of our case studies, the increased desire for market goods coupled with the fluctuating demand for certain Amazonian products produced a series of profound changes in indigenous Amazonian societies. Several of these changes, e.g. the increased rate of extraction and production for the market and the combination of reduced mobility and larger, more permanent settlements, have put enormous pressure on the local ecosystems and their natural resource base. We have seen extreme examples of this process in the case of the Quichua Community of 24 de Mayo whose members, assigned to relatively small family parcels, and engaged in intensive production for the market, have deforested their land at an alarming rate over the past 20 years.

Economic development which produces these kinds of results may generate cash income in the short term, but it generates greater poverty in the long term. Developing an economy that produces cash and a decent livelihood while ensuring the long term viability of the ecosystem and its natural resources is the greatest challenge now facing both the communities of indigenous Amazonians and the global market economy.

Zoning as a Management Strategy for Common Property Territories and Resources In most cases, the territories presently titled as communities, *comunas, and resguardos*, represent a finite set of resources that a settlement can count on to survive into future generations. Some, like the Colombian *resguardos* have ample resources for the future; others, like the Community of Pucaurquillo Bora will be hard pressed for survival within the next generation. It is essential and urgent that the residents and co-owners of all indigenous territories plan together how they can manage their territories to assure the survival of both the social group and the resources in the future.

Zoning has long been used as a tool long for managing large landscapes. The concept of the Biosphere Reserve, introduced by UNESCO in 1972, combines a zoning methodology with a multiple-use approach to delimit areas dedicated to a specific use within large conservation areas. As part of its world inventory of soil resources between 1958-1978, FAO applied the

concept of Agro-Ecological Zoning to determine the population carrying capacity of different soil regions of the earth. The methodology was eventually incorporated as standard practice by the ministries of agriculture of many countries as both a planning and a management tool for determining the crop growing potential of rural areas (FAO 1993).

A team of FAO consultants developed for Brazil a new zoning methodology they call Ecological-Economic Zoning, that shows great promise for the territories of indigenous Amazonians (Sombroek 1994; TCA 1998). We suggest, following the EEZ methodology, that a management plan for indigenous territories begin by defining zones compatible with the following use types:

- zones for human settlement and small scale agricultural activities,
- zones for pasture if the local market makes cattle raising a viable activity,
- zones for small-scale commercial extractive activities,
- zones for subsistence hunting and gathering,
- zones for conservation of ecosystem services and biodiversity.

The delimitation of these zones must be based on precise information about the make up of an indigenous territory. The zoning process requires the following kinds of information illustrated graphically in small scale maps (Sombroek 1994):

- a global picture of the physical make-up of the territory based on surveys of vegetative cover, soils, topography, surface water and current land use;
- knowledge and understanding of the important functions and services carried out by the local ecosystem (such as soil building or water quality control) and the role that the different species play in preserving those functions;
- inventories of renewable and non-renewable resources available that may have value for either subsistence and commercial use or for ecosystem services;
- knowledge and understanding of the interaction of these resources, their behavior, their reproduction, and the necessary conditions to maintain healthy stocks of the resource;
- estimates of the resource needs to satisfy the subsistence base of the local population;
- estimates of sustainable harvest- or extraction rates of specific commercially valuable resources based on an analysis of their available stocks, their behavior, and the reproduction or growth of the resource.

For small territories, like the 1,987 hectares of Pucaurquillo Bora, which were always managed by their owners, this is less of a problem as the members themselves have an

intimate knowledge of their entire territory. On the other hand, in the larger territories, like the 3 million hectare resguardo in the Putumayo of Colombia, each settlement may be familiar with its local area, but no individual has a global picture of the entire territory. In fact, there are large areas unknown to everyone. In either case, both data quality and local participation are important. That requires a team of technically trained field specialists and local people to gather and analyze the necessary information and to build a global picture from it.

Information should be gathered from all available sources, including the local NGOs, government ministries, oil companies, doctoral theses and complemented by that gathered in the field by the team. Maps of vegetation cover and current land-use for large areas are especially important and can best be produced by ground truthing a recent Landsat TMM image. Other important spatial data, gathered from other sources, such as the hydrographic system, roads, village sites, soil types, slope and property boundaries can be overlaid on the vegetation cover and land-use data coverages using Geographic Information Systems computer technology[3]. The overlay aids not only in registering the data correctly, but also in locating survey and transect sites for evaluating field data on vegetation type, location of important species, areas with special characteristics, etc. The systematization of these types of data using a geographic information system (GIS) program to demonstrate their spatial relationship provides the raw material for making proposals and reaching decisions on management plans for these large areas of common property.

Steps in developing such a management plan based on zoning would include (Sombroek 1994):

1. systematization of all available cartographic and descriptive data using a GIS system;
2. pre-zoning activities including identification of natural territorial units based on a thematic analysis of its bio-physical characteristics and the identification of the current land use and the socio-economic needs and perspectives for all parts of the territory;
3. zoning activities producing a recommended zoning model based on the integration of the natural zones with the socio-economic conditions; and
4. a process of negotiating agreements and norms among all the co-owners of the territory.

In each zone human activities need to be regulated according to the type of use established in the plan. The plan may detail how important species should be cared for and used, perhaps preserving areas important for the reproduction of certain animal species, imposing a ban on killing the females of endangered species, or locating seed trees which should not be cut

down. The plan may earmark locations of strategic resources like clays for pottery or palm trees for roofing materials or salt licks for wild game and regulate their use. Water quality and aquatic resources should be taken into account.

The plan should state clearly the agreed upon norms for tenancy and/or use rights within the different zones and should also make clear how the plan is to be enforced: that is, who can exercise authority or assign sanctions over those who do not respect the management plan. At the same time it is very important that the plan include a mechanism for monitoring the use of the resources and the impact of that use on the stocks of resources.

5. Factoring in Human Society and Needs

Institutions for Consensus Building and Collective Action If the management of a territory were a straightforward technical exercise in conservation biology, it would be a relatively simple matter. However, in indigenous Amazonia, each community is a web of complex social relations, interests and needs tenuously woven among relatively autonomous households. Each household makes its own decisions about how to satisfy its basic needs. In order for a territorial management plan to work, all the members of these social networks, that is all the co-owners of the territory, have to make many important decisions affecting their life together, and their shared use of the territory. That requires that each household surrender some of its autonomy to a central authority, entrusted with enforcing the management and other agreed upon norms and for promoting the common good. It is these social processes that are always at the root of complications and failures in resource management (Agrawal 1997; Bromley and Cernea 1989).

In indigenous Amazonian, collective actions are rarely taken unless all the members of the local group are in agreement. The basic egalitarian values and the respect for the autonomy of the other go hand in hand with the general absence of a tradition of strong centralized authority. No person or institution exercises any coercive power in these societies: no one can obligate anyone else to do anything. Most kin-defined local groups have headmen whose role as leader usually combines ritual and political functions. The headman's power, however, is exercised through leadership skills and example, rather than through force or coercion. Strong leaders, with broad appeal, appear in moments of stress as war leaders or as messiahs; but their power dissipates as the situation changes.

Achieving consensus on collective action in non-emergency situations normally takes time and requires leadership skills for negotiating agreements among many different interests. If there is strong opposition within the community, informal debates and negotiations may continue within households, in the council of elders or in assemblies of local residents until agreement is reached either to move forward or to drop the proposal.

The implementation of a management plan for an indigenous territory requires institutions

- that permit negotiation among the autonomous households, co-owners of the territory,
- that allow the co-owners to reach and express collective decisions,
- that are capable of monitoring and enforcing the decisions and norms established by the co-owners.

The first step has to be the common recognition of the need for mechanisms for making decisions for regulating the use of the common property. This calls for creating or strengthening local institutions that put into practice the group consensus, that enforce compliance with norms established, and that can take the lead in collective action. The modern process of establishing legally recognized land-owning communities has complicated this task.

Over the past three decades, pushed by an aggressive and violent frontier, most indigenous Amazonians have had to reassemble their settlements to form some sort of legally recognized property-owning group. Beginning in the 1960's, indigenous peoples and their organizations in western Amazonia, often encouraged by missionaries, anthropologists, or political organizers, adopted an essentially Andean form of collective ownership of lands and resources under the name of community, *comuna*, or *resguardo*. In some of these cases, this modern community may correspond with the traditional kin-based settlement, and as such with the traditional economic unit. But all of the communities we looked at in our study are a new type of social unit. They are regroupings of several traditional economic units, some of which had been allies and some enemies, together with "orphan" families, who are survivors or refugees of the rubber boom, virulent epidemics or the colonization frontier (Smith and Wray 1996; Smith 1996).

This is illustrated by the Parcialidad Yucuna composed of people of 16 different ethnic origins, and the Community of Pucaurquillo Bora made up of families of 9 different ethnic

backgrounds, all descended from refugees of the rubber boom. Whereas the Quichua Community of Mundayacu is the product of the amalgamation of many different *muntun* (economic units) pushed together by the colonization frontier, the Community of 24 de Mayo represents a new generation of communities formed as the result of a Quichua process of colonization (Informe Final 1995). In this latter case, individual families from many different settlements colonized an area of forest along a new highway, and legalized their parcels in the form of a *comuna*.

In all these cases, both the notion of property rights and that of common ownership and use by a group beyond the economic are new. The people have had to assimilate these ideas and put them into practice in the new context of national law and the market economy. In these cases where the modern community does not coincide with the traditional economic unit, there is confusion and ambiguity among its members over access to resources, usufruct rights and property rights.

In some cases, the centralized management of a large multi-ethnic territory may not be viable. For management purposes, these territories should be divided into smaller administrative units, with institutional arrangements for coordination among them. The management plan could combine arrangements made at the global level (e.g., establishment of a protection zone that cross-cuts many local administrative units), with those made within each local administrative unit.

Whatever the case, the challenge is to institutionalize local decision making processes and arrangements for enforcing those decisions. Understanding how the modern communities came into being and how they are structured socially can help design new administrative institutions that are viable.

Sorting Out the Economic Issues There are a number of very complex issues and dilemmas regarding the new indigenous Amazonian economy that need to be addressed in order to produce a sustainable livelihood for indigenous Amazonians. Some are of a more practical nature, like the need to find markets for new forest products, or the need to incorporate good administrative and accounting practices into economic initiatives. Many of these were explored in some detail in our study results. (Smith and Wray 1996)

Others are of a more profound nature, with roots in the very dynamics of exchange in indigenous and market-oriented cultures. A common reason for the failure of market-oriented economic initiatives in indigenous communities is that the manager, acting on traditional values, redistributes the business' resources to his kinfolk and neighbors in the form of personal, informal loans. According to the former manager of the Yanesha Forestry Coop, he was under constant pressure to make such cash loans to cover the expenses for curing a sick member of a community or for buying some urgently needed goods; others pressured the manager to loan the Coop's pick-up truck to transport a sick person to a regional hospital or to deliver a recently harvested crop to the market (Benavides and Pariona 1995; Gram et al 1994).

The project manager may be rewarded socially for his generosity in this case, after all his behavior is sanctioned by his society's moral order, but his concessions probably produced bankruptcy in the business. Contrary to indigenous values, owners of market-oriented initiatives must hoard and act in a "miserly" way to survive. For an initiative to be economically successful in a market context, its manager cannot generously redistribute the business' scarce capital; on the contrary he must invest the capital carefully in the business and accumulate any earnings.

Mauss' insight into the traditional gift economy was a major contribution to our understanding of the link between economy and society around the globe. He uses examples from ancient and present day societies to show that gift-giving and gift-receiving are obligatory and complementary parts of a system of total services in which "each gift is part of a system of reciprocity in which the honour of the giver and recipient are engaged." (Douglas 1990: viii) He speaks of "total services" because all members of the society are part of the system along with all of their spiritual and material possessions.

The gift economy is based on the simple rule that every gift must be returned. In some societies, the honor of the recipient demands that the return be of greater quality or quantity than the gift received leading to a spiraling exchange of wealth. In other societies, the expectation is that a gift be reciprocated with another of roughly the same value. However, as Mauss points out, this total system does not rely solely on the obligation to reciprocate; it also obliges its members to give presents and, just as important, to receive them. "To refuse to give, to fail to invite, just as to refuse to accept, is tantamount to declaring war; it is to reject the bond of alliance and commonality." (Mauss 1990: 13)

The gift economy is a system of exchange which takes place between persons living in a face-to-face

situation. It is the enhanced honor and status of the individual giver and receiver, his desire to establish an alliance for political purposes, or his need to secure a permanent source of salt- that is, the incentive of individual self-interest - which fuels this total system of exchange. But, unlike the modern market economy, the grand purpose of this total system is not the enhancement of the individual, but rather the strengthening of bonds among individual members of society.

By generating a perpetual cycle of exchanges, the gift economy binds all members of a community through their reciprocal obligations to one another. The beauty of this ancient practice is that, by linking the long term security of each individual to the strength of their bonds with the rest of their society, it goes much further than the modern market system to resolve the fundamental tensions between the individual's desires and the needs of society. The more that individual self interest drives the gift economy, the greater are the bonds of mutual indebtedness linking individuals to each other.

The market economy, on the other hand, imposes different obligations and pressures on its practitioners. Viewed from an Anglo-American perspective, the market economy is expected to raise the individual consumer's standard of living, that is, to allow each member of society to accumulate and enjoy more material wealth (Fallows 1994). Members of societies based on gift economies who are moving into the realm of a market economy, as is the case of most indigenous Amazonians, often find themselves faced with irreconcilable demands and expectations from the two.

The most fundamental of these is that between the gift economy's pressure on each person to give away his wealth generously in order to enhance his status, and the market economy's injunction to accumulate wealth privately as a means to heighten personal status. Caught between these two imperatives, members of modern indigenous communities are often confused about which obligation to fulfill, about how to best enhance their long term personal interest and security: by accumulating personal wealth or by strengthening the social bonds of mutual obligation.

All economic behavior is guided by a society-wide moral order which establishes values and norms. Giving and receiving are part of this moral order. To ensure that the gift economy functions, Amazonian societies developed cultural values which reinforce in each of their members the importance of giving, receiving, and reciprocating. Without such an internalized moral order which compels the members of society, the gift economy would not work. No one would feel any obligation to give away anything; and if they did, the recipient would be

under no obligation to receive the gift or to reciprocate.

Generosity became a central value in this moral system and continues to be rewarded with increased prestige and high status. On the other hand, indigenous Amazonian society frowns on selfishness, hoarding or accumulating material goods of any kind. Members of a local settlement who behave in stingy ways, who hide food or luxury items from view, receive silent scorn from the rest; if such behavior continues the offenders may be cut out of daily social life altogether.

The norms for giving and receiving within the framework of the gift economy determine how goods and services circulate within and among indigenous settlements. Reinforced by the moral authority of history as interpreted in myth, the moral order of Amazonian societies regulates these and other important relationships to ensure the sustainability of human society with the natural world. Despite the striking cultural diversity around the Amazon, the basic elements of this moral order are widely shared and understood among indigenous Amazonian societies (Smith and Wray 1996).

The moral order in indigenous societies, as in any society, receives influence from many different sources. Protestant and Catholic missionaries have undermined the traditional belief systems and persecuted the leaders of traditional religions. Public schools, commercial relations, labor outside the community, and, with greater frequency, radio and television convey new values while undermining traditional ones. With increasing frequency the younger generation, pulled toward satisfying their material desires from the marketplace, ignores the pleas of their elders' to respect the old ways.

In those societies moving from the gift economy into the market economy, there is often confusion about which values and norms are appropriate for managing economic life. Apart from the shift from traditional values and beliefs, many indigenous Amazonians are confused about when traditional and market values are applicable and when they are not. Do I allow my neighbor to take palm leaves from my parcel to repair his roof or do I sell them to him? If someone in my household is sick, do I have any claim to my brother's cattle for my emergency cash needs? Do the moral limits on taking from the natural world apply to products sold on the market, like rubber or *Sangre de Grado*? Is it acceptable for the women of the kin group to produce for and actively sell produce in the local market? Or is this exclusively a male role? Who does cash income belong to within the domestic unit and how

should it be managed?

One way out of this dilemma is for both value systems to coexist; indigenous Amazonians can learn to consciously separate the realm of indigenous economy with its values from that of the market economy. Indigenous Amazonians should be encouraged to recognize that different values and behaviors are appropriate for different realms of social life. A Guarayo parcel owner from Asención, when asked by a neighbor for palm leaves for roofing located within his parcel, responded with a display of generosity. He could not deny a request for subsistence needs from another member of his settlement. When the parcel owner found out later that his neighbor used the leaves for the roof of a local rancher's house, he was angry and demanded payment from his neighbor.

In this example, the parcel owner acted within the norms of the traditional moral order in the context of local subsistence needs; generosity, equal access to resources, and redistribution of surplus are the operative values. But in the market economy context, the palm leaves take on a monetary exchange value; they become a commodity with a price. The parcel owner was within his right to demand that the price be respected. Generosity is not appropriate in this context.

The indigenous economy is crucial for the long term sustainable livelihood of indigenous Amazonians; the traditional values are not only valid, but essential for its functioning. But participation in the market economy is also important for providing needed cash income; other values, like saving and initiative, are crucial for success in this realm. Both sets of values may be valid, but they are appropriate for different social contexts. Urban dwellers have long used this strategy to cope with the complex social situations they face every day. It is a valid response to a growing complexity in social life.

Indigenous Amazonians urgently need to develop a new moral order that integrates the market-oriented economic life with the rest of their social life. Indigenous Amazonians, through their representative organizations, need to sift through the traditional and new values and beliefs to decide which are useful for guiding the ethical decisions they need to make for maintaining the kind of society they want. The new moral order of the indigenous Amazonians must reflect these choices.

Human Society and Nature: Learning from the Past¡Error!Marcador no definido. The economy also entails complex social and political relations among the domestic units within the

settlement. Each settlement group needs to regulate its members' access to productive resources, the distribution of the production within the settlement, and the reproduction of the society's cultural resources. Indigenous Amazonian societies have perpetuated the value of equal access to productive resources for all members of the local settlement. No one in a settlement should be denied the resources necessary for his/her subsistence. At the same time, no one should go hungry when others have food: the norms of redistributing production ensure that all domestic units have roughly the food supplies they need.

There is a great deal of anthropological literature showing how each indigenous Amazonian culture in its own way considers all parts of the natural world, including human and spiritual beings, to be integrated into a single global system. From the traditional indigenous Amazonian point of view, reciprocity and moderation are the values which govern all relationships in the global system. Humans should not take from the system without giving in return; each hunter is expected to make a ritual return for an animal killed. Greed is severely reprimanded in indigenous cultures; the cultural ethic says no one should take more than he or she needs from the global system. The hunter who overkills a species faces severe retribution, even death, from the species genitor.

But humans need resources from the global system in order to survive; and for that reason, they are in perpetual debt to the natural world. That sense of indebtedness weighs heavily in the indigenous Amazonian's relationship with the world around him; it is a fundamental measure of moral control.

The desire for market goods has produced an erosion of this spiritual and integrative moral order. Our research team listened to Bora and Huitoto families living in the Community of Pucaurquillo Bora in 1992 lament the disappearance of game animals from their forests (Smith 1996; Smith and Wray 1996). To find large game animals like the jabali, deer and the tapir, hunters had to walk five days into the forest, and even then, it was now mostly a matter of luck to find something. Since 1990, the only market which has expanded in this region is that for game meat. With the other alternatives gone, wild game meat became the only economically viable extractive option. The high price paid made the effort worth while. But the game disappeared quickly.

Indigenous Amazonians urgently need to reflect on the loss of their traditional moral order and the consequences of that loss. We recommend that as part of the planning process,

indigenous Amazonians make a deliberate attempt to reconstruct an ethic for managing their relations with the natural world based on reciprocity, moderation and equilibrium.

6. Conclusion: The Challenge for Indigenous Amazonians

Secure access to a wide variety of resources found within a recognized and titled territory is the *sine qua non* for building a sustainable livelihood for indigenous Amazonians; but that is only the first step. Along with the right to and need for a secure territory goes an obligation to resolve economic issues, to manage the resources and to govern that territory well.

In a frontier region like the Amazon, with the constant political violence and instability and the economic rapaciousness and greed that go along with opening and incorporating new regions into a dominant political and market system, unfolding history can be very volatile. So even particularly interesting cases of community-based use and conservation of resources, which today are held out as hopeful models, like USAID's Pichis-Palcazu Resource Management Project in the late 1980's, may end up being tomorrow's pariah project. In the Palcazu case, the addition of guerrilla terror and brazen narco-greed to an already politically weakened project in the late 1980's resulted in a breakdown of the institutional arrangements and abandonment of the collective management efforts. By 1994 community members were selling off the timber from the forest plots once managed by the Yanesha Forestry Cooperative while the million dollar investment in its infrastructure and equipment provided by the project sat idle (Benavides and Pariona 1995, Gram et al 1994).

Developing and implementing management plans and related economic initiatives for the recently recognized territories of indigenous Amazonians is the urgent next chapter in the long history of their struggle for survival and recognition. While there are many important technical and scientific aspects to successful territorial management, positive outcomes in this process ultimately depend on how a series of social factors are addressed. We examined two of the deepest level, and therefore most complicated, sets of social factors in this paper: 1. the development of new institutions for governing these territories that go beyond the local kin and ethnic affiliations to include all co-owners of a territory; and 2. the development of a new moral and economic order that combines the indigenous values of social solidarity, equilibrium and reciprocity that preserve both the community and its resource base, with values linked with the market economy that permit the sustainable exploitation of natural

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[2] For Urubichá, the average family parcel size is 88 hectares; the average size land holding for the surrounding non-Indian ranchers is 5,214 hectares (Informe Final 1995).

[3] For a discussion of Geomatics and indigenous peoples, see Cultural Survival Quarterly (Geomatics, Who Needs It?),, V 18 No 4 1995. The contributions to a recent workshop "Geomatics and Indigenous Territories in Latin America", held in Peru in June 1998 and sponsored by the Instituto del Bien Comun, Center for the Support of Native Lands, and Project Land Earth Observation, are in the process of publication.